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The paper explores conceptually the relationship between trust and deception. The au-
thor advances five main propositions, which concern deceptive signals of trustworthi-
ness, the suspension of uncertainty in trust, the moral implications of trusting and 
deceiving, the trustor’s self-deception, and the reversibility of trust. The overall con-
clusion is that trust and deception both enable and prevent one another and that this 
ambivalent relationship is due to the leaps and lapses of faith that characterize trust and 
distrust. Beyond implications for further research on trust and deception, the trust–
deception ambivalence is practically relevant for making better sense of cases of decep-
tion in private and public life against the background of trust relationships that enable, 
prevent, require, and prohibit deception – all at the same time.
Zusammenfassung
Der Beitrag erörtert konzeptionell das Verhältnis zwischen Vertrauen und Täuschung. 
Der Autor schlägt fünf allgemeine Thesen zu täuschenden Signalen der Vertrauenswür-
digkeit, dem Aufheben von Ungewissheit im Vertrauen, den moralischen Implikationen 
von Vertrauen und Täuschen, der Selbsttäuschung im Vertrauen und der Reversibilität 
von Vertrauen vor. Die allgemeine Schlussfolgerung lautet, dass Vertrauen und Täu-
schung sich gegenseitig sowohl ermöglichen als auch verhindern und dass diese ambi-
valente Beziehung auf dem für Vertrauen und Misstrauen charakteristischen Schenken 
und Entziehen von Glauben beruht. Die Ambivalenz zwischen Vertrauen und Täu-
schung ist nicht nur für die weitere Forschung von Belang, sondern sie ist auch prak-
tisch relevant, um Fälle von Täuschung im privaten wie im öffentlichen Leben besser 
verstehen zu können, indem man sie vor dem Hintergrund von Vertrauensbeziehungen 
betrachtet, welche Täuschung – gleichzeitig – ermöglichen, verhindern, erfordern und 
verbieten.
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Introduction
Deception is always topical and interesting, touching on very basic social foundations, 
temptations, and emotions. In times when phrases like “weapons of mass deception” 
(Rampton/Stauber 2003; see also O’Shaughnessy 2004) evoke cynicism and anger around 
the world, we may easily believe that contemporary politicians, journalists, managers, 
scientists, lovers, and others are particularly deceptive, but the prevalence of deception 
is hard to compare historically in empirical terms. We do not know if we are deceived 
more frequently or extensively than before. Arguably, the occurrence of deception as 
such is mostly less noteworthy than the meaning and implications of specific cases.
We only need to look around us to identify the most recent incidents of deception, 
but some cases from antiquity are at least as exciting: for example, Zeus, who was both 
deceived and seduced by Hera, his own wife in disguise. This example from Greek my-
thology and countless other stories of sexual masquerades and amorous identity games 
over the centuries (see, for example, Doniger 1996) bring out basic questions about 
the skills and, more importantly, the motives of both the deceiver and the deceived. 
How is deception achieved? How can it be recognized? Why is it committed? And why 
is it uncovered or, rather, not? Deception can occur for better or worse, knowingly or 
unknowingly, with relief or with regret. Whether it is seen as harmless or disastrous, 
commendable or outrageous depends on the relationship between the deceiver and the 
deceived, the nature of their mutual trust, and their place in society. Anyhow, it is a key 
characteristic of human agency and vulnerability that one can mislead the other.
Before engaging in a more detached conceptual analysis, it is important to note that 
deception involves some of the strongest experiences in social life for the deceiver, the 
deceived, and their social networks, too. For example, Werth and Flaherty (1986) de-
scribe vividly the emotional turmoil that is common for all parties involved in cases of 
infidelity. Generally, every case of suspected or detected deception goes beyond the de-
ception itself. It “may be a threat to the whole relationship” (Goffman 1959: 71) between 
the deceiver and the deceived, and it may cast doubt on their mutual obligations and 
membership of the same community within a society. Once deception is present in any 
This paper is a preliminary version of a chapter to be published in a volume on deception edited 
by Brooke Harrington for Stanford University Press (forthcoming in 2008). A previous version was 
presented at the Santa Fe Institute Workshop on “Deception: Methods, Motives, Contexts & Conse-
quences” in Santa Fe, New Mexico, U.S.A., March 1–4, 2007, and the 4th Workshop on Trust Within 
and Between Organizations at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands, October 25–26, 2007. 
I have benefited greatly from discussions with the other workshop participants, especially Maureen 
O’Sullivan and Antoinette Weibel. Moreover, I am deeply grateful to Brooke Harrington for encour-
aging me to write on this topic in the first place and for carefully editing a previous version of this 
text. Patrik Aspers and Sascha Münnich provided very thoughtful and constructive feedback in the 
MPIfG’s internal review process for this Working Paper. I also appreciate and enjoy the help of Sabine 
Stumpf (research assistant) and John Booth (language editor). Finally, since I build selectively on the 
first five chapters of my book “Trust: Reason, Routine, Reflexivity,” I thank the publisher, Elsevier, for 
permission to use this material.
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way, trust is usually disturbed and trustworthiness is reconsidered, too, when the act of 
deception is seen as a betrayal of the trustor’s positive expectations and willingness to 
be vulnerable. 
Yet surprisingly, there has been very little systematic research on the relationship be-
tween trust and deception (Robinson/Dirks/Ozcelik 2004).1 About a hundred years ago, 
Simmel (1950 [1908]: 313) pointed out that “modern life is based to a much larger ex-
tent than is usually realized upon the faith in the honesty of the other” and that, under 
modern conditions, the lie becomes particularly devastating as “something which ques-
tions the very foundations of our life.” Later on, Goffman (1959) noted that trust makes 
us prone to being duped and misled, but these classic sources contain remarks that, in 
the end, are just as casual as those of recent authors such as Hamlin (2005: 219) who 
states that “[t]he issue of trust and honesty may be seen as strongly (inversely) related 
to the issue of deception,” but who does not explore the relationship between trust and 
deception in any detail. Therefore, it is the aim of this paper to propose fundamental 
connections between the two concepts, bringing together key ideas from the enormous 
literature on trust and the less extensive but equally diverse literature on deception.
Looking at trust and deception, it appears intuitively that the former is “good” and the 
latter is “bad.”2 This intuition matches the primary moral connotations of trust and 
deception, but we have to be careful and distinguish between acts, intentions, and out-
comes. The normative content lies mainly in the intentions and outcomes, while acts of 
trusting (accepting evidence) and deceiving (faking evidence) per se are relatively neu-
tral operations. It is possible that deception is socially desirable, a recognized skill, well 
intentioned or even an entertaining pleasure (Goffman 1959; Vasek 1986; Chandler/
Afifi 1996; Hollander 1996; Ryan 1996; Croson 2005; Dumouchel 2005; Shulman 2007). 
And if there is a bright side to deception, there is also a dark side to trust (McAllister 
1997). Gambetta (1988), for example, asks whether we can trust trust, and many oth-
ers point to the potentially negative motives and consequences of trust (Langfred 2004; 
Gargiulo/Ertuk 2006). Moreover, the first normative impressions start to blur when 
we ask how trust and deception influence each other. Consider, for example, Ekman 
(1996: 806), who notes: “Trust makes one vulnerable to being misled, as usual levels 
of wariness are reduced and the benefit of the doubt is routinely given.” Clearly, this 
should make trust just as suspicious as deception. Hence, the positive bias of trust and 
the negative bias of deception are really just biases, and the attributes “harmful” and 
“beneficial” can be attached to both trust and deception. This is why it is interesting to 
analyze the relationship between the two concepts and to ask how far trust and decep-
1 The work reported in Castelfranchi and Tan (2001) is an exception, but it is limited due to its 
focus on “virtual societies”, which the authors define broadly as including any computer-based 
form of networked communication from multi-agent systems with artificial agents to online 
communities connecting real human actors.
2 In her seminal book on lying, Bok (1978), for example, argues strongly that lying is morally 
wrong; Hamlin (2005) remarks that deception is considered a “bad” thing in itself; and Hosmer 
(1995) presents trust as a desirable ethical bond.
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tion enable or prevent each other. Is deception invited or avoided through trust? Is trust 
destroyed by deception or is there an element of deception in all trust?
The following considerations are intended to explore the characteristics of the rela-
tionship between trust and deception in more detail.3 After outlining some conceptual 
foundations, I first discuss how trustors can be deceived about the trustworthiness of 
others. I then argue that trust always involves a leap of faith, which increases the oppor-
tunities for the trustee to deceive the trustor. However, because this leap implies moral 
obligations, trust may reduce the threat of deception by the trustee. I then turn to the 
trustor and discuss the self-deception involved in all forms of trusting which, as I note 
subsequently, does not mean that trust is irreversible or unconditional. I conclude the 
paper by summarizing my main points and highlighting the implications for further 
conceptual and empirical research. The overall picture points to an ambivalent relation-
ship between trust and deception: they simultaneously enable and prevent each other.
Conceptual foundations
In order to explore the relationship between trust and deception fruitfully, it is necessary 
to lay down some conceptual foundations. If we look at trust first, Rousseau and her 
colleagues (1998: 395) offer a widely supported definition of trust as “a psychological 
state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations 
of the intentions or behavior of another.” From this we can already derive that trust is 
essentially the state of expectation of a trustor, and it must not be confounded with the 
bases from which it is reached (antecedents), nor with the trusting actions (enactments) 
resulting from trustful expectations (Hardin 2001). Manifestations of trust are any em-
pirical incidents in which this state of expectation is reached, irrespective of whether 
the trustor is conscious of this or whether it is directly observable by others in any way.
The carrier of trust is the actor as an entity that can have expectations and refer to 
them in action (Bachmann 1998). The trustor expects favorable intentions and actions 
on the part of the object of trust – another actor referred to as the trustee (Baier 1986; 
Gambetta 1988).4 In short, we need to be able to identify trustors and trustees in order 
to speak of trust.
3 The perspective adopted is mainly that of trust research, but with the aim of a balanced analysis 
with implications for further research on deception as well as trust.
4 Going beyond Rousseau et al.’s (1998) strictly psychological definition, it is not only individual 
persons but also collective or even nonhuman entities that could be classified as trusting or 
trusted actors as long as it is possible to ascribe expectations and actions to them meaningfully 
(Nooteboom 2002).
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The general problem of trust arises due to the principal vulnerability and uncertainty 
of the trustor toward the trustee (Luhmann 1979; Rousseau et al. 1998). The trustee 
can harm the trustor, who cannot be absolutely sure whether this will happen, but who 
can be aware of and influence the extent to which s/he is vulnerable to harm (Luhmann 
1979; Dasgupta 1988; Gambetta 1988). The actions of the trustor and the trustee are 
therefore interdependent.
Moreover, the social vulnerability and uncertainty underlying the problem of trust re-
flect the agency of both trustor and trustee, who are autonomous in that their states of 
mind and actions are not fully determined. Neither trust as a state of mind nor genu-
inely trustworthy behavior can ultimately be forced or guaranteed (Gambetta 1988; 
Bachmann 1998). Trustors and trustees have a choice. If they had not, we would not 
need the concept of trust. Hence, trust is indeed “risky” (Luhmann 1979: 24) in the gen-
eral sense of the word, but it is irreducible to calculation.5 Therefore, as I discuss below, 
it is more than a probabilistic investment decision under risk.
It is also important to note exactly how vulnerability is understood in the context of 
trust. Vulnerability is a precondition for trust: that is, the trustor can always be harmed 
in principle, but in reaching a state of trust, the trustor no longer expects to be harmed. 
The definition of trust by Rousseau et al. (1998) is sometimes misunderstood in this 
respect, as is the following definition by Mayer and his colleagues (1995: 712), who 
propose that trust is “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the action of another 
party based on an expectation that the other party will perform a particular action 
important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other 
party.” The “intention to accept vulnerability” (Rousseau et al. 1998) and the “willing-
ness to be vulnerable” (Mayer/Davis/Schoorman 1995) should not to be understood 
as the “willingness to be hurt,” but as highly optimistic expectations that vulnerability 
is not a problem and no harm will be done. Trust is not about avoiding or eliminating 
vulnerability, or resigning to it, but about positively accepting it.
Often, trusting and being trustworthy are not so much conscious decisions, but rather 
a matter of taken-for-grantedness and routine (Möllering 2006). Building on Schütz’s 
(1967 [1932]: 98) concept of “natural attitude,” authors such as Garfinkel (1963) and 
Zucker (1986) point out that in many contexts it is normal to trust in the sense of rely-
ing on others to respect the rules and play their roles. It is only when actors deviate from 
this normality that trust – or rather distrust – becomes an explicit issue. Vulnerability 
is always present, though, and it depends on the circumstances whether actors will tend 
to trust routinely or whether they will take it for granted that others generally cannot 
be trusted.
5 Note that uncertainty is used here in the sense introduced by Knight (1971 [1921]), who distin-
guished between “risk-as-randomness,” in which the probabilities of alternative outcomes can 
be assigned, and “risk-as-uncertainty,” in which neither the alternatives nor the probabilities are 
known by the actor.
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It follows that it is also important to recognize that the trustor and the trustee are em-
bedded in a social context which influences how they can define themselves as actors 
and enact their agency (Meyer/Jepperson 2000). Networks of social relationships (Gra-
novetter 1985) and institutionalized rules (Berger/Luckmann 1966) are particularly 
important in setting the context for trust. Trust is in practice never a purely dyadic 
phenomenon between isolated actors; there is always a context, a history, and the influ-
ence of other actors.
In sum, without actors, expectations, vulnerability, uncertainty, agency, and social em-
beddedness, the problem of trust does not arise. I will discuss in later sections how this 
problem is dealt with when it arises. Overall, I will use the following definition: “trust 
is an ongoing process of building on reason, routine, and reflexivity, suspending ir-
reducible social vulnerability and uncertainty as if they were favorably resolved, and 
maintaining thereby a state of favorable expectation toward the actions and intentions 
of more or less specific others” (Möllering 2006: 111, emphasis in the original). In com-
parison to other works on trust, this definition emphasizes that trust is not static and 
that it requires leaps of faith.
The notion of deception certainly warrants a detailed discussion in itself (see, for ex-
ample, Mitchell 1986; Shulman 2007). For the purposes of this paper I propose to apply 
the same conditions to the concept of deception that I have outlined for the notion of 
trust above: there have to be at least two actors (Chandler/Afifi 1996), one of whom 
can deceive the other and both of whom play their part in whether deception occurs. 
Deception also requires standards of truth and honesty from which a deceiver deviates. 
This deviation has to make a difference; it must have the potential to cause (or prevent) 
damage to a vulnerable other. The precondition of uncertainty – especially in the sense 
of asymmetric information – enters the picture because deception would not be an 
issue if all actors possessed the same knowledge and were able to know with certainty 
who will (try to) deceive whom, when, where, and how. Moreover, actors have to have 
a choice as to whether they deceive the other party in a dyadic relationship, as well as 
whether to trust the other party or suspect deception. Finally, it is hard to imagine de-
ception in a context-free environment: the context (such as institutions and networks) 
will always have an influence on the meaning and form of deception and its conse-
quences. At a minimum, the deceiver’s reputation may be at stake, and this is a concern 
that actors take into account. 
I define deception as the deliberate misrepresentation of an actor’s identity, intentions, 
or behaviors, as well as the distortion of any facts relevant to the relationship between 
actors. This captures the gist of other definitions, but with less emphasis on the element 
of opportunism and guile, because the deceiver’s motives may well be laudable. Focus-
ing on the act of deception, not its motives and consequences, Axelrod (1979: 391), for 
example, refers to deception as “deliberate attempts to mislead” (see also DePaulo et al. 
2003). Dictionaries state that deceiving means misleading, and it is commonly assumed 
that deception is intentional and not just accidental. Ekman (2001 [1985]: 41) adds that 
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deception, in contrast to obvious irony or parody, involves misleading others “without 
giving any notification of the intent to do so.” Hence, the deceived is not simply given 
wrong information, but also “kept deceived about the private opinion of the liar,” who 
knows the correct information (Simmel 1950 [1908]: 312, emphasis in the original). 
Rizvi (2005: 26) sees deception in a somewhat more competitive light as “an attempt 
to gain the upper hand,” and Dumouchel (2005: 56) observes more normatively that 
deception moves the deceived “to act in ways that contradict their best interests.” Simi-
larly, Hamlin’s comprehensive definition (2005: 205) stipulates that “deception occurs 
whenever an individual deliberately uses or reveals false information, or omits using 
or revealing true information,” adding that this implies “an attempt to influence beliefs 
or behavior to the advantage of the deceiver.” Whatever definition is applied, the act of 
misleading should not be confounded with its intentions and consequences. 
The conceptual foundations of deception presented here build on and relate back to 
three main streams of deception research.6 First, psychological work on deception 
works with similar conceptualizations and devotes most of its efforts to measuring 
the frequency and typology of lies and to understanding how deception can be per-
formed and detected, paying particular attention to the verbal and non-verbal tricks 
and clues of deception (see, for example, Mitchell 1996; Ekman 2001 [1985]; DePaulo 
et al. 2003). Second, deception has been studied in economics, especially from game-
theoretical perspectives, where the focus of inquiry is on whether deception pays off 
and which structural conditions promote or deter deception (see, for example, Akerlof 
1970; Axelrod 1979; Gerschlager 2005). Third, in social psychology and sociology, many 
classic authors such as Simmel have been concerned with the problem of lying, as noted 
above, often in close correspondence with moral philosophy (Bok 1978). Goffman’s 
(1959) dramaturgical perspective gives an unusual view of “misrepresentations” in that 
he demonstrates that people always present but a part of themselves, that they have to 
manage the impressions they give, and that in most encounters the issue is not so much 
about what is true or false, but more about what is appropriate and acceptable role 
behavior. This view is still very topical as can be seen, for example, in Shulman’s (2007) 
recent work on the role of deception in the workplace. I will draw on the diverse prior 
literature on deception again in the next sections.7
6 Deception is also a topic in the deeply philosophical literature on epistemology, with questions 
revolving around the concepts of truth and self, which can only be hinted at in this paper in 
passing (see, for example, Haight 1980; Elster 1986). The concept of deception rests on the mod-
ern notion that there are selves who can know to some extent what is true or false, but who can 
still be misled, because they cannot have perfect knowledge.
7 My definitions of trust and deception reflect that I am interested in social relationships, and the 
definitions may therefore be either broader or narrower than definitions used outside of the 
social sciences. For example, whether it makes sense to speak of trust and deception in relation 
to animals and very young children partly depends on whether we believe that animals and very 
young children are able to have social relationships and refer to their own and others’ interests 
and intentions (see, for example, Mitchell 1996; Vasek 1986; Chandler/Afifi 1996).
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Signals and other (deceptive) bases of trust
Although key properties of trust cannot be fully accounted for in rational choice terms, 
it is a useful starting point for trust research generally – and for this exploration of trust 
and deception in particular – to consider the problem from the focal point of rational 
choice approaches to trust: How can the trustor recognize a trustworthy trustee? Con-
versely, how can the trustor identify an untrustworthy trustee and, more dramatically, 
avoid a trustee who only pretends to be trustworthy and wants to deceive the trustor?
The most straightforward rational choice answer to this question is that a trustee is 
trustworthy when it is not in his/her interest to be untrustworthy toward the trustor. In 
other words, trustworthiness depends on the payoffs in a given trust game. This implies 
that, if necessary, a trustee can be made trustworthy by modifying the payoffs, ideally in 
such a way that, by exploiting trust, the trustee will harm himself/herself (Hardin 2001). 
Similarly, the incentives for deception decrease severely when actors share goals, such as 
increased efficiency from coordination (Croson 2005). However, this approach hinges 
on the trustor’s ability to estimate net payoffs reliably, which makes this a dubious heu-
ristic in reality (Kee/Knox 1970). Trustors can be deceived by trustees and other parties 
about the true payoff structure of the game, which exacerbates the danger of trusting on 
the basis of this kind of analysis.
Nevertheless, this approach is very much mainstream, and it is refined further by intro-
ducing a probabilistic element, whereby it is assumed that a trustee is sometimes trust-
worthy and sometimes untrustworthy or, more precisely, that a certain number of trust-
ees in a given population are trustworthy while the rest are untrustworthy (Dasgupta 
1988; Coleman 1990). If the probability of meeting either type is known, the trustor can 
apply it to the payoff structure of a given trust game and determine whether trusting 
has a positive expected value or not. As much as this approach with its numerous fur-
ther refinements has to offer, it cannot resolve the problems of (self-)deception in the 
generation of reliable estimates for payoffs, probabilities, and other assumptions.
The same applies to the literature that looks for indicators of trustworthiness that are 
not primarily a matter of payoff and probability in a particular situation, but capture 
relatively stable characteristics of a trustee. The trust literature features a number of 
such indicators of trustworthiness. To some extent they are derived empirically, as in 
the studies by Henslin (1968) or Gambetta and Hamill (2005), both of which describe, 
based on ethnographic fieldwork, the various criteria that taxi drivers use in order to 
discriminate between trustworthy and untrustworthy passengers. In a more abstract 
model, Mayer et al. (1995) propose ability, benevolence, and integrity as the main indi-
cators of trustworthiness. Despite some variation on the labels, definitions, and opera-
tionalizations, such indicators are widely accepted and used in trust research to explain 
why people trust.
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The indicators may be commonsensical, but so is the possibility that – due to asym-
metric information – they may be misinterpreted by the trustor or deliberately faked by 
the trustee (Akerlof 1970; Axelrod 1979). This is where signaling theory (Spence 1974) 
comes in and, according to Bacharach and Gambetta (2001: 159), only those signals of 
trustworthiness are reliable that would be too costly for an inherently untrustworthy 
trustee to fake: “No poisoner seeks to demonstrate his honesty by drinking from the 
poisoned chalice.” Specifically, while Dasgupta (1988) has argued that an inherently 
untrustworthy trustee has an even bigger incentive to send (fake) signals of trustworthi-
ness than the inherently trustworthy trustee – which means that the signals are actually 
useless per se – Bacharach and Gambetta (2001) point out that it may take substantially 
more effort to mimic a signal than to send it naturally. The greater this difference is, the 
more reliable the signal is but, in line with Dasgupta, it still holds that the bigger the 
payoff from deceiving a trustor, the more likely it is that an untrustworthy trustee will 
incur the costs of mimicking the signal.8
However, research also shows that actors are “poor deception-detectors and yet are 
overconfident of their abilities to detect deception” (Croson 2005: 113; see also Ek-
man 1996). This introduces the additional complication that, beyond the question of 
which signals of trustworthiness are reliable, actors should also pay attention to signals 
of deceit. Theoretical and practical work on deception detection identifies, for exam-
ple, physical, behavioral, and logical patterns that can indicate deception.9 Specialist 
literature in this area discusses, for example, how human resource managers can train 
themselves to be more alert to a candidate’s deception in selection processes and how 
they can organize these processes to reduce the risk of falling for a cheat (Walley/Smith 
1998). Ultimately, though, this creates further signaling games – this time about mask-
ing signals of deception – which a deceiver will be willing to play if the incentives are 
attractive. And somewhat ironically, according to Shulman (2007), the new hires then 
become liars in the workplace anyway, because organizational reality encourages, re-
quires, or even forces them to use deception.
Hence, although signaling theory introduces the notion that deception may be costly – 
which is an important insight – it boils down to estimates of net payoffs and probabili-
ties that are hard to ascertain in practice due to limitations on the trustor’s part and the 
semiotic chaos and ambiguity in most real-life situations. As Frank (2007) puts it, there 
is no “Pinocchio response” in the sense of a single, unambiguous clue to deception.
8 Goffman (1959: 73) notes, however, that “while the performance offered by impostors and liars 
is quite flagrantly false and differs in this respect from ordinary performances, both are similar 
in the care their performers must exert in order to maintain the impression that is fostered.” In 
other words, even genuinely honest people must make sure that they are being seen as honest 
and not mistaken for liars.
9 These patterns can be observed more or less reliably using lie detectors, standardized tests, or 
perceptive observation; about which see the classic book by Ekman (2001 [1985]) and the meta-
analysis by DePaulo et al. (2003).
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However, the core problem with research that looks for reliable bases of trust is not sim-
ply that this quest is futile, but, more seriously, that it misses the point that trust occurs 
when the trustor makes a leap of faith, takes the trustworthiness of others for granted, 
and does not keep on looking for evidence and safeguards. In other words, when we talk 
about trust bases, we are still in the realm of decisions under risk, subsuming the risk of 
deception, but we are not yet considering the essence of trust, which sets trust apart from 
mere risk assessment. In exploring the relationship between trust and deception, it is less 
interesting to analyze how trustors can be (or can avoid being) deceived about bases for 
their trust than it is to discuss how trust in itself both increases and decreases the threat 
of deception, and how trust and deception both enable and destroy each other.
The leap of faith: Suspension of doubt and suspicion
Simmel (1990 [1907]) does not regard mere weak inductive knowledge – that is, infer-
ences from prior observations – as proper trust (see also Möllering 2001). Trust goes 
beyond simply predicting that the future will be like the past, because the conviction 
that the future can be known has to be produced as well. Simmel recognizes that within 
trust there is a “further element of socio-psychological quasi-religious faith” (179). In 
the same source, Simmel expresses that he finds this element “hard to describe” and 
thinks of it as “a state of mind which has nothing to do with knowledge, which is both 
less and more than knowledge.”10
In another source, interestingly right after a short discussion of lying, Simmel (1950 
[1908]: 318) describes trust as “an antecedent or subsequent form of knowledge” that is 
“intermediate between knowledge and ignorance about a man.” Complete knowledge or 
ignorance would eliminate the need for or possibility of trust. Accordingly, trust com-
bines weak inductive knowledge with some mysterious, unaccountable faith: “On the 
other hand, even in the social forms of confidence, no matter how exactly and intellec-
tually grounded they may appear to be, there may yet be some additional affective, even 
mystical, ‘faith’ of man in man.” Giddens (1990) recognizes that Simmel believes trust 
differs from weak inductive knowledge and he strongly supports the view that trust “pre-
sumes a leap to commitment, a quality of ‘faith’ which is irreducible” (Giddens 1991).
The leap of faith connotes agency without suggesting perfect control or certainty. I in-
troduce the term “suspension” (Möllering 2001: 414) to capture the underlying process 
that enables actors to deal with irreducible uncertainty and vulnerability. First, to say 
10 Simmel (1990 [1907]: 179) expresses this element of faith as “the feeling that there exists be-
tween our idea of a being and the being itself a definite connection and unity, a certain consis-
tency in our conception of it, an assurance and lack of resistance in the surrender of the Ego to 
this conception, which may rest upon particular reasons, but is not explained by them.”
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that trust involves the suspension of uncertainty and vulnerability implies an “as if” 
attitude on the part of the trustor. Trusting involves “a movement toward indifference: 
by introducing trust, certain possibilities of development can be excluded from consid-
eration. Certain dangers which cannot be removed but which should not disrupt action 
are neutralized” (Luhmann 1979: 25, emphasis in the original). However – and this is 
perhaps the most important point to note since it is easily misunderstood – suspension 
in the true Hegelian sense of Aufheben means that vulnerability, doubt, and uncertainty 
are not eliminated. Rather, following Hegel (1973 [1807]: 94), “Aufheben” captures the 
dialectical principle of synthesis transcending thesis and antithesis, thereby simultane-
ously preserving and rescinding them. Hence, when actors achieve suspension for trust, 
they treat uncertainty and vulnerability as unproblematic, even if it could still turn out 
that they are problematic. Leaps of faith enable trust to take place, but this does not rule 
out lapses of faith later on.
For the discussion about deception, this has the following implications. First, we might 
say that someone who begins to trust stops worrying about deception (and other things 
that would jeopardize positive expectations). For example, when people use digital me-
dia and communicate using technologically mediated messages, they can frequently 
reach a point where their wariness about deception leads to paralysis and certainly not 
to the desired in-person date or to further digital exchanges. Only when they trust be-
yond the potentially false information on their screen are they able to interact – for 
better or worse. More clearly, people who still worry about deception are not really 
trusting, because they have not achieved suspension yet. They may be willing to take a 
risk and cooperate nevertheless, but they do not really trust. 
Second, when trust is reached and the danger of deception is suspended, this actually 
opens the door to deception. In Goffman’s (1959: 65) terms, when an audience ac-
cepts cues on faith, “this sign-accepting tendency puts the audience in a position to be 
duped and misled.” In a theater this is the basis of much entertainment, but in real-life 
“performances” it is more of a threat. Granovetter (1985) also notes that placing trust 
creates an enhanced opportunity for malfeasance on the part of the trustee. The trustee 
could deceive the trustor and display trust-honoring behavior while actually exploiting 
the trust behind the trustor’s back. The trustor, having positive, trusting expectations, 
would not monitor the trustee to the same extent as a distrusting actor would. Again, we 
can imagine very well how information given truthfully and trustfully can be abused by 
a recipient or, in return, how deliberately incorrect information can mislead a trusting 
recipient for better or worse.
Jones (1996: 4) conceptualizes trust “in terms of a distinctive, and affectively loaded, 
way of seeing the one trusted” and what I call suspension matches the special twist of 
her definition whereby positive feelings – or, generally, firm positive expectations – be-
come an interpretative lens that interferes with the trustor’s assessment of the other’s 
trustworthiness: “The harms they might cause through failure of goodwill are not in 
view because the possibility that their will is other than good is not in view” (12). More-
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over, inasmuch as trust means a willingness to be vulnerable, the trustor may even fuel 
his/her vulnerability, and thus the incentives for deception and the potential damage 
(or good) that could be done increase, too. Overall, when actors trust they accept the 
possibility of being deceived and the impossibility of completely avoiding deception 
and its desirable or harmful outcomes.
Acceptance does not mean denial or capitulation, nor does it rule out that trust is with-
drawn later on when positive expectations are disappointed. However, trust does not 
anticipate deception, which is why the trustee is able to carry it out unnoticed by the 
trustor. To make matters worse, one act of unnoticed deception often triggers further 
such acts and possibly an escalation of deception, because the deceiver wants to conceal 
the initial deception and/or has self-reinforcing incentives to exploit the situation fur-
ther and further (Fleming/Zyglidopoulos 2006).11
Overall, if trust opens the door to potentially harmful deception, this makes trust ap-
pear foolish and dangerous. Should we not be very careful whom we trust and per-
haps prefer to cooperate without trust (Cook/Hardin/Levi 2005)? Following Walley and 
Smith’s (1998) advice, we should be more alert and informed, arming ourselves with 
techniques and technologies that discourage and detect deception. However, this kind 
of thinking misses the crucial point that it is the leap of faith in trust which enables 
positive social interaction with great potential benefits to take place instead of falling 
into a paralyzing paranoia of opportunism. Trustors are, by definition, vulnerable to 
deception, but could not this also be the root of a norm of special protection for trus-
tors? If trust as the willingness to be vulnerable is desirable, should not those who trust 
and make themselves vulnerable enjoy the social support of others in the same way that 
children are saved from harm? Should not malevolently deceiving someone who trusted 
be punished much more severely than deceiving someone who distrusted or merely 
gambled? If this logic is accepted, then conveying trust could actually reduce the threat 
of harmful deception.
Trust’s compulsory power against harmful deception
While the above considerations have been mainly analytical, the moral connota-
tions of trust and deception can hardly be ignored (Bok 1978; Hosmer 1995). Simmel 
(1950 [1908]: 348) attributes an “almost compulsory power” to trust and claims that 
“to betray it requires thoroughly positive meanness.” Interestingly, Simmel makes these 
statements in the context of an analysis of secret societies, which are particularly reliant 
11 Well-intentioned deception can spiral out of control, too, as in the German movie “Good Bye 
Lenin!” where the East German character Alex has a hard time, a few months after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, pretending to his sick mother (a devoted socialist) that nothing has changed in the 
German Democratic Republic.
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on trust among their members – and which may resort to drastic, immoral sanctions 
when this trust is broken. But we do not need to consider mafia practices in order to 
appreciate that betrayals of trust can cause damage – and outrage – beyond the ordi-
nary losses of resources and opportunities. In the trust literature, addressing Simmel’s 
basic concerns even if not always citing him, authors such as Uslaner (2002) present 
trust as a moral value within societies. This perspective raises obvious questions about 
how strong the moral value of trust is in different social circles at different times and in 
different places. The moral power of trust is also limited by the somewhat tautological 
requirement that trust must not be given blindly or lightly.12 Moreover, there are many 
grey areas where it is difficult to establish if deception has actually occurred and if moral 
consequences should follow. Nevertheless, within limits, those who make themselves 
more vulnerable by trusting might also expect a higher level of protection and those 
who deceive might expect more severe punishment because (and as long as) trust is 
seen as a public good protected by moral norms within a given community (see, for 
example, the experiment by Brandts/Charness 2003).
With specific reference to deception, we can therefore recognize the possibility that trust 
opens the door to deception, but, inasmuch as deception implies the harmful betrayal 
of trust, the door is not just open but has a highly visible “Friends only!” sign above it. 
This may be a more effective strategy for preventing deception than to keep the door 
closed or even locked with a “Keep out!” sign attached. We know that deception sur-
rounding infidelity, for example, usually triggers highly negative moral and emotional 
reactions on the part of the deceiver and the deceived (Werth/Flaherty 1986) and, I 
would add, within their social networks, too. And Goffman (1959: 65) remarks that it is 
“only shame, guilt, or fear” that prevents actors from opportunistically deceiving trust-
ing others.13 
At any rate, when trust is highly valued and the deception of trustors is strongly con-
demned, the overall effect of trust may well be a reduction in the actual occurrence of 
deception. This is not the first strategy that comes to mind when we think about reduc-
ing deception. It is also a strategy with severe boundary conditions, but it is not com-
pletely unrealistic. After all, we all trust lots of other people every day – it is a natural 
attitude in the Schützian sense – and usually we believe, more or less explicitly, that our 
trust induces others to be trustworthy. It does not always work, since trust can always be 
disappointed. And trust may not always be welcome by the trustee, because of the obli-
gations it entails, which might become too much or simply be unwanted and untenable 
for the trustee. Nevertheless, trust always presents deception in a different light or, in 
12 The notion of “optimal trust” (Wicks/Berman/Jones 1999) appears equally absurd, since trust 
entails positive expectations without perfect knowledge of future outcomes.
13 Moreover, distrust – rather than trust – might encourage deception. For example, (excessive) 
control produces reduced effort and shirking, which may induce a spiral of ever-greater control, 
distrust, and malfeasance (Zand 1972; Sitkin/Stickel 1996; Shulman 2007).
Möllering: Inviting or Avoiding Deception through Trust?  17
any case, it frames the moral context in which deception occurs (Robinson/Dirks/Ozce-
lik 2004).
Living as if the future were known: Trust as (self-)deception? 
In the previous sections, I have looked at how trust enables and prevents deception. 
However, we need to ask whether, in return, deception might also both sustain and 
destroy trust. Let us take a closer look at the trustor and his/her leap of faith. If trust 
means that people have positive expectations despite some irreducible uncertainty, are 
they not deceiving themselves in their trust? Lewis and Weigert (1985) express this most 
clearly when they state that “to trust is to live as if certain rationally possible futures will 
not occur” (ibid.: 969, emphasis in the original) and that “to trust is to act as if the un-
certain future actions of others were indeed certain” (ibid.: 971). For Luhmann (1979: 
10), to show trust is “to behave as though the future were certain.” The power, but also 
the fragility, of the “as if” must not be underestimated. Trust does not rest on objective 
certainty but on “illusion” (ibid.: 32). It rests on the fiction of a reality in which social 
uncertainty and vulnerability are unproblematic. This matches findings in deception 
research: for example, Mitchell’s (1996: 840) observation that “a victim’s wanting to 
believe in the deception comes up repeatedly in deception scenarios.”
The fiction of trust needs to be achieved and sustained psychologically by the individual, 
and this fiction of trust is also a “socially constructed fiction of trust” (Beckert 2005: 19), 
produced intersubjectively through interaction with others and through institutional-
ized practices. It is striking that, because social uncertainty and vulnerability are only 
suspended in trust, the actors can remain aware that they are deceiving themselves, for 
the better or worse, as long as the fiction of trust and trustworthiness is upheld.
The notion of self-deception raises difficult philosophical and psychological questions 
about multiple selves as well as the relationship between cognition and affect (Haight 
1980; Elster 1986; Shapiro 1996). However, the problem is mitigated in the case of trust 
because trustors are not assumed to make themselves believe something that they know 
to be wrong. They (merely) reach positive expectations by suspending the doubts that 
they might still have.14 Hence, the main inconsistency trustors bear is that trust “risks 
defining the future” (Luhmann 1979: 20) although trustors know that the future is ul-
timately unknowable.
How do actors create the fiction that enables them to trust? As a first attempt at answer-
ing this question, let us consider the concept of “overdrawn information” (überzogene 
Information) introduced by Luhmann (1979: 32). When actors “overdraw” information 
14 See also the references below to William James’s “will to believe” and the “sentiment of rationality.”
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they make inferences beyond what the underlying information can actually support. In 
the face of a deficit of information, they deliberately overinterpret whatever informa-
tion is available to “serve as a springboard into uncertainty” (33). We are reminded of 
the search for indicators of trustworthiness discussed at the beginning of this paper and 
the signals perceived by taxi drivers (Henslin 1968; Gambetta/Hamill 2005). However, 
while “overdrawn information” is a plausible idea that confirms the need for at least 
some kind of basis for trust, we still need to be able to specify the conditions under 
which actors come to not only accept but also go beyond a given level of information 
and construct a fictional version of reality that allows them to trust.
Beckert (2005) reminds us that the trustee plays a very important part in creating the 
trustor’s fiction. The trustee offers “a definition of himself” (Henslin 1968: 54) as well 
as a definition of the situation and does so with empathy for the trustor’s needs, “creat-
ing the impression of trustworthiness” (Beckert 2005: 19). Such an approach is more 
easily said than done and goes beyond the mechanistic signaling games suggested by 
Bacharach and Gambetta (2001). The trustee’s performative acts require impression 
management (Goffman 1959), self-confidence and ontological security (Erikson 1965), 
and an active engagement in social relations: “Whoever wants to win trust must take 
part in social life and be in a position to build the expectations of others into his own 
self-presentation” (Luhmann 1979: 62; see also Giddens 1994). Trustors and trustees 
build and maintain their positive fiction. In deception research this might be referred to 
as “a shared delusional system” (Mitchell 1996: 841).
In sum, trustors rely to a great extent on trustees when constructing an image of those 
trustees as being worthy of trust or not. Nevertheless, the fiction co-produced by trustor 
and trustee remains a fiction, potentially a dangerous sham, and it is still up to the trus-
tor to suspend uncertainty and vulnerability. The trustee’s performative (potentially 
deceptive) acts and a high level of (potentially self-deceiving) familiarity with the situ-
ation merely assist the trustor in making the leap of faith. Countless daily activities and 
interactions rely on fictions and only become possible because people act as if they were 
possible (Ortmann 2004). The “as if” can have a number of different meanings. First, 
the “as if” in the sense of the Schützian “natural attitude” (Schütz 1967 [1932]: 98) refers 
to the action-enabling qualities of taken-for-grantedness and continuity. Second, “as if” 
can also refer to the more performative “taking something for something” or “defining 
something as something.” For example, by addressing somebody as if s/he were a friend, 
s/he becomes a friend. With reference to trust, this comes close to Hardin’s (1993) “as-if 
trust,” where an actor becomes trustworthy because others treat him/her more or less 
deliberately as if s/he were trustworthy. They take him/her for a trustworthy person and 
in so doing make him/her a trustworthy person. Note the “almost compulsory power” 
(Simmel 1950 [1908]: 348) attributed to trust as outlined above. 
Third, the concept of “as if” can also refer to the construction of unrealistic but never-
theless helpful idealizations. For example, the image of an ideal institution, organiza-
tion, person, or practice as being trustful and trustworthy may never be realized fully in 
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reality; yet, by actors behaving as if it were reality or, at least, as if the ideal were being 
seriously pursued, trust is facilitated. It is worth exploring this interesting conjunction 
and peculiar linguistic trick of “as if” further. I propose that it enables us to understand 
the relationship between trust and deception better, because it suggests that trust and 
deception do not always work against each other but can complement each other in 
creating and maintaining a common understanding of social reality. This is not a value 
in itself, however, if it allows some to prosper and causes others to suffer. Trust and de-
ception will be revised in the light of their outcomes.
Lapses of faith: Trust is no license to deceive
While trust opens the door to deception and involves a kind of self-deception by the 
trustor, the positive expectations at the heart of trust must be realized in order for trust 
to endure over time. Trustors who make a leap of faith still monitor the outcomes of 
their trust and usually notice when their expectations are disappointed. To be sure, 
trustees may enjoy the benefit of the doubt, and trust is not easily broken; on the con-
trary, it can be quite robust, because trustors seek to confirm their positive expectations 
(Good 1988). Numerous empirical studies in psychology illustrate this confirmation 
bias, and there are many anecdotal examples of the strength of self-deception: for exam-
ple, people are frightened after watching a horror movie, although they (should) know 
that it was only a movie; or television viewers grieve over the death of Lassie, although 
they (should) know that the dog playing the role is actually fine in reality; or mothers 
refuse to believe that their “good son” is actually a criminal, despite the facts presented 
to them (see, for example, Schelling 1986). 
Continued self-deception in the form of denial, as a first response to suspected or de-
tected deception, gives the deceived time to come to terms with the deception and with 
the imminent loss and emotional turmoil that it triggers (Werth/Flaherty 1986). How-
ever, when the evidence is irrefutable, self-deception will end. As Shapiro (1996: 799) 
writes, “there are limits to self-deception in the specific sense that it is never completely 
successful … genuine belief remains present, only for the time being out of reach.” When 
things go unmistakably wrong in trust relationships, trustors feel betrayed and the leap 
of faith will quickly turn into a lapse of faith (Robinson/Dirks/Ozcelik 2004).
After all, trust is an idiosyncratic achievement on the part of the trustor, which ulti-
mately “cannot be requested” (Simmel 1950 [1908]: 348), but must come from within, 
and cannot be sustained if the trustor’s faith is lost. This brings us to Luhmann’s (1979: 
32) observation that trust is an “operation of the will” where “the actor willingly sur-
mounts this deficit of information.” Trust transcends that which can be justified by the 
actor in any terms, but the actor exercises agency through his/her will to either suspend 
uncertainty and vulnerability or not. Luhmann’s reference to “will” in the context of 
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trust and suspension inspires a closer look at James’s essay on “The Will to Believe” 
(1948 [1896]), a pragmatist approach to the theme of faith, which Beckert (2005) has 
also identified as highly instructive for understanding trust. 
In this essay, James defends the actor’s right to believe – in religious matters, but also 
generally: for instance, in social relations – even when there is no conclusive evidence. 
Such a belief would be called faith: “we have the right to believe at our own risk any 
hypothesis that is live enough to tempt our will” (1948 [1896]: 107). Note that by intro-
ducing the condition that the hypothesis has to be “live enough,” James points out that 
actors only believe that “which appeals as a real possibility to him[/her] to whom it is 
proposed” (ibid.: 89).
Implicitly, he thus refers back to his earlier essay, “The Sentiment of Rationality” (James 
1948 [1879]), and to the major principles of his pragmatist philosophy. In the earlier 
source, he says that faith is “synonymous with working hypothesis” (ibid.: 25). Accord-
ing to James, the ability to have faith is distinctly human. He defines faith as follows: 
“Faith means belief in something concerning which doubt is still possible; and as the 
test of belief is willingness to act, one may say that faith is the readiness to act in a cause 
the prosperous issue of which is not certified to us in advance” (ibid.: 22).
Thus, from the standpoint of James’s pragmatism, faith requires the “sentiment of ra-
tionality” – in other words, the actor genuinely believes something to be true without 
conclusive justification, but based on the pragmatic qualities of the belief, such as being 
useful, giving expectations, and enabling action. This sentiment produces the will to be-
lieve. Faith in these terms matches exactly that element in trust which – like a “tranquil-
izer” (Beckert 2005: 18) – allows the trustor to have favorable expectations toward the 
actions and intentions of others whose behavior cannot be fully known or controlled. 
From a different perspective, this faith might look like the “overconfidence” (Coval/
Hirshleifer/Teoh 2005) discussed in parts of the (self-)deception literature, except that 
faith and trust are vested in others and not just in one’s own capabilities. 
Overall, James does not assume that actors take leaps of faith lightly or foolishly. Faith 
as a part of trust has to resonate with the actor’s experience. It has to feel right, true, 
plausible, and so on, in spite of inconclusive evidence. It follows that trust rests on a 
kind of “will to trust,” but trust cannot be willed against the trustor’s very personal and 
private sentiments. This means that lapses of faith will occur when the trustor has clear 
evidence of deception or betrayal. In sum, to say that trust entails a leap of faith is not 
to say that trust is irreversible or unconditional. Trust is not trust if it cannot be broken 
or withdrawn. Hence, practices of deception that exploit trust and harm the trustor 
are only sustainable as long as the trustor believes (or can be misled to believe) that no 
harm is done. 
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Summary and implications for further research
In this paper, I have outlined five main points for discussion and further research into 
the relationship between trust and deception:
Trustors can be deceived when interpreting signals of trustworthiness, but some si-1. 
gnals are more reliable than others because they cannot easily be faked.
Trust always involves a leap of faith, and hence goes beyond “good reasons,” which 2. 
opens the door to deception.
Trust bestows a moral obligation on the trustee, which reduces the threat of decep-3. 
tion.
Trust requires some degree of self-deception on the part of the trustor, who creates 4. 
an “as if” scenario, a kind of fiction that vulnerability and uncertainty are unproble-
matic.
Trust is not irreversible or unconditional; the leap of faith turns into a lapse of faith 5. 
when the trustor recognizes deception and unfulfilled expectations.
Overall, these propositions demonstrate that trust and deception both enable and pre-
vent one another, and that this ambivalent relationship is due to the leaps and lapses of 
faith that characterize trust and distrust. This is clearly a preliminary conclusion and a 
long way from operationalization and empirical validation. It is also selective, for there 
are other issues in the relationship between trust and deception that I have not yet ex-
plored and which should be addressed in future research. For example, trust research 
has recently turned to the question of how trust can be repaired after it has been broken 
(Lewicki/Bunker 1996; Kim et al. 2004).15 Deception is a special form of breach of trust, 
and further research should devise specific propositions as to how repairing trust fol-
lowing deception differs from repairing trust after other kinds of breach or mere “trou-
ble” (Six 2005). Moreover, the ideas offered here are rather undifferentiated in the sense 
that we might distinguish between different forms of deception (see Anderson 1986 for 
a typology) and how actors respond to them, as well as between different forms of trust, 
yielding a matrix of numerous, more precise trust–deception relationships (Robinson/
Dirks/Ozcelik 2004).
If trust and deception, so far, have been treated mainly in separate research streams, 
what is the benefit of joining these streams and using the conceptual insights presented 
in this paper? For trust research, integrating the problem of deception should mean a 
reinterpretation of the trustors’ and trustees’ roles. For example, in empirical work on 
trust and trustworthiness, we cannot take responses in surveys and interviews at face 
value in case the respondent might be subject to (self-)deception. We can refer to decep-
tion as an explanation not only for why trust is withdrawn but also for why it endures. 
15 See also the Special Topic Forum on “Repairing Relationships Within and Between Organiza-
tions” forthcoming in Academy of Management Review 34(1).
22 MPIfG Working Paper 08/1
And the ambivalent nature of the trust–deception relationship should lead us to be 
careful with general normative statements about trust and deception. 
Research on deception can benefit from recognizing the relevance of trust because this 
will extend the analysis from very technical concerns about acts of deception to the so-
cial contexts in which deception occurs. As I have argued, trust relationships can explain 
not only why deception is possible – and sometimes necessary – but also why actors 
choose not to deceive or why trustors collude with the deceiver. Goffman’s (1959) dra-
maturgical perspective can be reinterpreted as a collective effort at maintaining an “as 
if” scenario for trust that allows for, and requires, a certain amount of deception. Hence 
deception will be seen not so much in terms of what is true or false, but in terms of the 
benefit or harm it produces for social relationships.
The empirical relevance of the ambivalent relationship between trust and deception can 
only be hinted at here, but let us consider two examples. First, “trust in food” (Kjærnes/
Harvey/Warde 2007) is a hot and recurrent topic with disgusting cases of producers 
deceiving consumers by selling adulterated wines and mislabeled meat, for example. 
There is no doubt that these are harmful criminal acts. Their implications clearly reach 
beyond individual incidents, destroying much of the consumer’s trust in wine and meat 
producers and regulatory systems more generally. At the same time, consumers have to 
ask themselves why they trusted in the first place and whether it is not all too convenient 
to believe in the safety of (suspiciously cheap) food. Overall, modern life seems impos-
sible without trust in food, which makes deception possible, but the consequences of 
exposed deception and a loss of trust are so severe that most producers will abstain from 
opportunism and invest in their reputation – and they will assist consumers in main-
taining the fiction that food is safe.
Second, deception by politicians is the object of so much public outrage that it is sur-
prising that people still trust them at all. If trust means living as if the future were bright 
and certain, then politicians deliver just that: promises that they know what is good for 
us, that we will be better off, and that our soldiers will only engage in clean, justified acts 
of war. People are more than willing to accept these convenient but unrealistic promises 
until the outcomes are undeniably poor or even catastrophic. Hence, trust in politicians 
not only enables deception but even calls for it. This does not make deception morally 
acceptable, though, which is why politicians have to hide their deceptions and get used 
to losing peoples’ trust eventually and then regaining it by making new, convenient 
promises which people are happy to accept. In the relationships between politicians and 
voters – and within political coalitions – many strange episodes are stories of how trust 
and deception both enable and prevent one another.
Thus, the trust–deception ambivalence that has been explored conceptually in this pa-
per is practically relevant for making better sense of cases of deception in private and 
public life against the background of trust relationships that enable, prevent, require, 
and prohibit deception – all at the same time. 
Möllering: Inviting or Avoiding Deception through Trust?  23
References
Akerlof, George A., 1970: The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. 
In: Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 488–500.
Anderson, Myrdene, 1986: Cultural Concatenation of Deceit and Secrecy. In: Robert W. Mitchell/
Nicholas S. Thompson (eds.), Deception: Perspectives on Human and Nonhuman Deceit. Albany: 
SUNY Press.
Axelrod, Robert, 1979: Coping with Deception. In: Steven J. Brams/Andy Schotter/Gerhard Schwö-
diauer (eds.), Applied Game Theory. Würzburg: Physica-Verlag.
Bacharach, Michael/Diego Gambetta, 2001: Trust in Signs. In: Karen S. Cook (ed.), Trust in Society. 
New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 148–184.
Bachmann, Reinhard, 1998: Conclusion: Trust – Conceptual Aspects of a Complex Phenomenon. 
In: Christel Lane/Reinhard Bachmann (eds.), Trust Within and Between Organizations. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 298–322.
Baier, Annette, 1986: Trust and Antitrust. In: Ethics 69, 231–260.
Beckert, Jens, 2005: Trust and the Performative Construction of Markets. Cologne: Max Planck Insti-
tute for the Study of Societies.
Berger, Peter L./Thomas Luckmann, 1966: The Social Construction of Reality. Garden City: Doubleday.
Bok, Sissela 1978: Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Live. New York: Pantheon.
Brandts, Jordi/Gary Charness, 2003: Truth or Consequences: An Experiment. In: Management Sci-
ence 49, 116–130.
Castelfranchi, Christiano/Yao-Hua Tan (eds.), 2001: Trust and Deception in Virtual Societies. Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Chandler, Michael J./Jamie Afifi, 1996: On Making a Virtue out of Telling Lies. In: Social Research 63, 
731–762.
Coleman, James S., 1990: Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Cook, Karen S./Russell Hardin/Margaret Levi, 2005: Cooperation Without Trust? New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation.
Coval, Joshua/David Hirshleifer/Slew Hong Teoh, 2005: Self-deception and Deception in Capital 
Markets. In: Caroline Gerschlager (ed.), Deception in Markets: An Economic Analysis. Basing-
stoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 113–130.
Croson, Rachel T.A., 2005: Deception in Economics Experiments. In: Caroline Gerschlager (ed.), 
Deception in Markets: An Economic Analysis. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 113–130.
Dasgupta, Partha, 1988: Trust as a Commodity. In: Diego Gambetta (ed.), Trust: Making and Break-
ing Co-operative Relations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 49–72.
DePaulo, Bella M., et al., 2003: Cues to Deception. In: Psychological Bulletin 129, 74–118.
Doniger, Wendy, 1996: Sex, Lies, and Tall Tales. In: Social Research 63, 663–699.
Dumouchel, Paul, 2005: Rational Deception. In: Caroline Gerschlager (ed.), Deception in Markets: An 
Economic Analysis. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 51–73.
Ekman, Paul, 1996: Why Don’t We Catch Liars? In: Social Research 63, 801–817.
——, 2001 [1985]: Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Politics and Marriage. New York: 
Norton.
Elster, Jon (ed.), 1986: The Multiple Self. Cambridge University Press.
Erikson, Erik H., 1965: Childhood and Society. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Fleming, Peter/Stelios C. Zyglidopoulos, 2006: The Escalation of Deception in Organizations. Cam-
bridge: Judge Business School.
Frank, Mark G., 2007: Thoughts, Feelings, and Deception. The Santa Fe Institute Workshop on “De-
ception: Methods, Motives, Contexts & Consequences.” Santa Fe, New Mexico, U.S.A., March 
1–4, 2007.
Gambetta, Diego, 1988: Can We Trust Trust? In: Diego Gambetta (ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking 
Co-operative Relations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 213–237.
Gambetta, Diego/Heather Hamill, 2005: Streetwise: How Taxi Drivers Establish Their Customers’ 
Trustworthiness. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
24 MPIfG Working Paper 08/1
Garfinkel, Harold, 1963: A Conception of, and Experiments with, ‘Trust’ as a Condition of Stable 
Concerted Actions. In: O.J. Harvey (ed.), Motivation and Social Interaction. New York: The Ron-
ald Press Company, 187–238.
Gargiulo, Mark/Gokhan Ertuk, 2006: The Dark Side of Trust. In: Reinhard Bachmann/Akbar Zaheer 
(eds.), Handbook of Trust Research. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 165–186.
Gerschlager, Caroline (ed.), 2005: Deception in Markets: An Economic Analysis. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Giddens, Anthony, 1990: The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
——, 1991: Modernity and Self-Identity. Cambridge: Polity Press.
——, 1994: Risk, Trust, Reflexivity. In: Ulrich Beck/Anthony Giddens/Scott Lash (eds.), Reflexive 
Modernization. Cambridge: Polity Press, 184–197.
Goffman, Erving, 1959: The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. London: Penguin.
Good, David, 1988: Individuals, Interpersonal Relations and Trust. In: Diego Gambetta (ed.), Trust: 
Making and Breaking Co-operative Relations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 31–48.
Granovetter, Mark, 1985: Economic Action and Social Structure: A Theory of Embeddedness. In: 
American Journal of Sociology 91, 481–510.
Haight, Mary R., 1980: A Study of Self-Deception. Brighton: The Harvester Press.
Hamlin, Alan, 2005: Deception, Regulation and Politics. In: Caroline Gerschlager (ed.), Deception in 
Markets: An Economic Analysis. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 205–235.
Hardin, Russell, 1993: The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust. In: Politics & Society 21, 505–529.
——, 2001: Conceptions and Explanations of Trust. In: Karen S. Cook (ed.), Trust in Society. New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 3–39.
Hegel, Georg W.F., 1973 [1807]: Phänomenologie des Geistes. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
Henslin, James M., 1968: Trust and the Cab Driver. In: Marcello Truzzi (ed.), Sociology and Everyday 
Life. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 138–158.
Hollander, John, 1996: The Shadow of a Lie: Poetry, Lying, and the Truth of Fictions. In: Social Re-
search 63, 643–661.
Hosmer, Larue T., 1995: Trust: The Connecting Link between Organizational Theory and Philo-
sophical Ethics. In: Academy of Management Journal 20, 379–403.
James, William, 1948: Essays in Pragmatism. New York: Hafner Press.
Jones, Karen, 1996: Trust as an Affective Attitude. In: Ethics 107, 4–25.
Kee, Herbert W./Robert E. Knox, 1970: Conceptual and Methodological Considerations in the Study 
of Trust and Suspicion. In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 14, 357–366.
Kim, Peter H., et al., 2004: Removing the Shadow of Suspicion: The Effects of Apology versus Denial 
for Repairing Competence- versus Integrity-based Trust Violations. In: Journal of Applied Psy-
chology 89, 104–118.
Kjærnes, Unni/Mark Harvey/Alan Warde, 2007: Trust in Food: A Comparative Institutional Analysis. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Knight, Frank H., 1971 [1921]: Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
Phoenix Books.
Langfred, Claus W., 2004: Too Much of a Good Thing? Negative Effects of High Trust and Individual 
Autonomy in Self-managing Teams. In: Academy of Management Journal 47, 385–399.
Lewicki, Roy J./Barbara B. Bunker, 1996: Developing and Maintaining Trust in Work Relationships. 
In: Roderick M. Kramer/Tom R. Tyler (eds.), Trust in Organizations. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 
114–139.
Lewis, J. David/Andrew J. Weigert, 1985: Trust as a Social Reality. In: Social Forces 63, 967–985.
Luhmann, Niklas, 1979: Trust and Power: Two Works by Niklas Luhmann. Chichester: Wiley.
Mayer, Roger C./James H. Davis/F. David Schoorman, 1995: An Integrative Model of Organizational 
Trust. In: Academy of Management Review 20, 709–734.
McAllister, Daniel J., 1997: The Second Face of Trust: Reflections on the Dark Side of Interpersonal 
Trust in Organizations. In: Roy J. Lewicki/Blair H. Sheppard/Robert Bies (eds.), Research on 
Negotiation in Organizations. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Möllering: Inviting or Avoiding Deception through Trust?  25
Meyer, John W./Ronald L. Jepperson, 2000: The ‘Actors’ of Modern Society: The Cultural Construc-
tion of Social Agency. In: Sociological Theory 18, 100–120.
Mitchell, Robert W., 1986: A Framework for Discussing Deception. In: Robert W. Mitchell/Nicholas 
S. Thompson (eds.), Deception: Perspectives on Human and Nonhuman Deceit. Albany: SUNY 
Press, 3–40.
——, 1996: The Psychology of Human Deception. In: Social Research 63, 820–861.
Möllering, Guido, 2001: The Nature of Trust: From Georg Simmel to a Theory of Expectation, Inter-
pretation and Suspension. In: Sociology 35, 403–420.
——, 2006: Trust: Reason, Routine, Reflexivity. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Nooteboom, Bart, 2002: Trust: Forms, Foundations, Functions, Failures and Figures. Cheltenham: Ed-
ward Elgar.
O’Shaughnessy, Nicholas J., 2004: Politics and Propaganda: Weapons of Mass Seduction. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press.
Ortmann, Günther, 2004: Als ob: Fiktionen und Organisationen. Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag.
Rampton, Sheldon/John Stauber, 2003: Weapons of Mass Deception: The Uses of Propaganda in Bush’s 
War on Iraq. New York: Tarcher/Penguin.
Rizvi, S. Abu Turab, 2005: Deception and Game Theory. In: Caroline Gerschlager (ed.), Deception in 
Markets: An Economic Analysis. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 25–49.
Robinson, Sandra L./Kurt T. Dirks/Hakan Ozcelik, 2004: Untangling the Knot of Trust and Betrayal. 
In: Roderick M. Kramer/Karen S. Cook (eds.), Trust and Distrust in Organizations. New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation.
Rousseau, Denise M., et al., 1998: Not so Different after All: A Cross-discipline View of Trust. In: 
Academy of Management Journal 23, 393–404.
Ryan, Alan, 1996: Professional Liars. In: Social Research 63, 619–641.
Schelling, Thomas C., 1986: The Mind as a Consuming Organ. In: Jon Elster (ed.), The Multiple Self. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 177–195.
Schütz, Alfred, 1967 [1932]: The Phenomenology of the Social World. Evanston: North-Western Uni-
versity Press.
Shapiro, David, 1996: On the Psychology of Self-deception. In: Social Research 63, 785–800.
Shulman, David, 2007: From Hire to Liar: The Role of Deception in the Workplace. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press.
Simmel, Georg, 1950 [1908]: The Sociology of Georg Simmel. New York: Free Press.
——, 1990 [1907]: The Philosophy of Money. London: Routledge.
Sitkin, Sim B./Darryl Stickel, 1996: The Road to Hell: The Dynamics of Distrust in an Era of Quality. In: 
Roderick M. Kramer/Tom R. Tyler (eds.), Trust in Organizations. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 196–215.
Six, Frederique, 2005: The Trouble with Trust. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Spence, M.A., 1974: Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Pro-
cesses. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Uslaner, Eric M., 2002: The Moral Foundations of Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vasek, Michael E., 1986: Lying as a Skill: The Development of Deception in Children. In: Robert W. 
Mitchell/Nicholas S. Thompson (eds.), Deception: Perspectives on Human and Nonhuman De-
ceit. Albany: SUNY Press, 271–292.
Walley, Liz/Mike Smith, 1998: Deception in Selection. Chichester: Wiley.
Werth, Lucy F./Jenny Flaherty, 1986: A Phenomenological Approach to Human Deception. In: Rob-
ert W. Mitchell/Nicholas S. Thompson (eds.), Deception: Perspectives on Human and Nonhuman 
Deceit. Albany: SUNY Press, 293–311.
Wicks, Andrew C./Shawn L. Berman/Thomas M. Jones, 1999: The Structure of Optimal Trust: Moral 
and Strategic Implications. In: Academy of Management Journal 24, 99–116.
Zand, Dale E., 1972: Trust and Managerial Problem Solving. In: Administrative Science Quarterly 17, 
229–239.
Zucker, Lynne G., 1986: Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic Structure, 1840–
1920. In: Barry M. Staw/Larry L. Cummings (eds.), Research in Organizational Behavior. Green-
wich, CT: JAI Press, 53–111.




The Social Order of Markets
DP 07/14
G. Piotti
Why Do Companies Relocate? 




The Architecture of Multi-





The Two Dimensions of 
Nonliberal Capitalism
DP 07/11
G. Möllering, F. Stache
German–Ukrainian Business 
Relationships: Trust 





The Evolution of Bargaining 
under Austerity: Political 
Change in Contemporary 





Can We Reform the Welfare 
State in Times of „Grey“ 
Majorities? The Myth of an 
Electoral Opposition between 











Social Democrats and 
Education Spending: A Refined 




Corporate Values in Local 
Contexts: Work Systems and 




Trade Policy Lobbying in the 





Princeton University Press, 2008
Brooke Harrington
Pop Finance: Investment Clubs 
and the New Investor Populism
Princeton University Press, 2008 
J. Beckert, R. Diaz-Bone,  
H. Ganßmann (Hg.) 
Märkte als soziale Strukturen
Campus, 2007
U. Dolata, R. Werle (Hg.),
Gesellschaft und die Macht der 
Technik: Sozioökonomischer 
und institutioneller Wandel 
durch Technisierung
Campus, 2007
J. Beckert, B. Ebbinghaus,  
A. Hassel, P. Manow (Hg.)
Transformationen des 
Kapitalismus. Festschrift für 










Order printed copies from the MPIfG (you will be 
billed) or download PDF file from the MPIfG website 
(free).
MPIfG Working Papers
Order printed copies from the MPIfG (you will be 
billed) or download PDF file from the MPIfG website 
(free).
MPIfG Books




Consult our website for the most complete and up-
to-date information about MPIfG publications and 
publications by MPIfG researchers. To sign up for 
newsletters and mailings, please go to Service on the 
MPIfG website. Upon request to info@mpifg.de, we 
will be happy to send you our Recent Publications 
brochure.
ERPA
MPIfG Discussion Papers and MPIfG Working Papers 
in the field of European integration research are 
included in the European Research Papers Archive 
(ERPA) which offers full-text search options:  
http://eiop.or.at/erpa.
Das Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung 
ist eine Einrichtung der Spitzenforschung in den 
Sozialwissenschaften. Es betreibt anwendungsoffene 
Grundlagenforschung mit dem Ziel einer empirisch 
fundierten Theorie der sozialen und politischen 
Grundlagen moderner Wirtschaftsordnungen. 
Im Mittelpunkt steht die Untersuchung der Zu-
 sammen hänge zwischen ökonomischem, sozialem 
und politischem Handeln. Mit einem vornehmlich 
institutionellen Ansatz wird erforscht, wie Märkte 
und Wirtschaftsorganisationen in historisch-institu- 
tionelle, politische und kulturelle Zusammenhänge 
eingebettet sind, wie sie entstehen und wie sich ihre 
gesellschaftlichen Kontexte verändern. Das Institut 
schlägt eine Brücke zwischen Theorie und Politik und 
leistet einen Beitrag zur politischen Diskussion über 
zentrale Fragen moderner Gesellschaften.
The Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies 
conducts advanced basic research on the governance 
of modern societies. It aims to develop an empirically 
based theory of the social and political foundations  
of modern economies by investigating the interrelation 
between economic, social and political action. Using 
primarily an institutional approach, it examines how 
markets and business organizations are embedded 
in historical-institutional, political and cultural 
frameworks, how they develop, and how their social 
contexts change over time. The institute seeks to build 
a bridge between theory and policy and to contribute 
to political debate on major challenges facing modern 
societies.
